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In quantum key distribution(QKD), one can use a classical
CSS code to distill the final key. However, there is a constraint
for the two codes in CSS code and so far it is unknown how to
construct a large CSS code efficiently. Here we show that the
BDSW method given by Bennett et al can be modified and
the error correction and privacy amplification can be done
separately with two independent parity matrices. With such
a modification, BDSW method can be used to distill the final
key without any classical computational complexity. We also
apply the method to the case of imperfect source where a
small fraction of signals are tagged by Eve.
Introduction. Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–7]
could be the one that is closest to immediate application
in practice because of its relative low technical overhead:
the only thing required there is preparation, transmis-
sion and measurement of a 2-level quantum state, e.g., a
single photon.
The security proof of QKD is strongly non-trivial. How-
ever, it is greatly simplified if we look at the problem
from the entanglement distillation viewpoint. The first
protocol for the entanglement distillation was given by
Bennett et al [3,4], BDSW protocol. It was then pointed
out by Deutsch et al [8] that the distillation protocol
can be used for secure QKD: we can first purify the en-
tangled pairs and then take measurement in the same
basis on each side. Latter on, it was shown that [9–11]
actually the fidelity result of distillation protocol [3] is
always correct given whatever initial state of the raw
pairs: Suppose in the case that each raw pairs are in a
Bell state, the protocol may distill out m pairs in a state
ρ whose fidelity to m perfect entangled pairs is almost 1.
As it has been shown by Lo and Chau [9], if the fidelity
is exponentially close to 1, then Eve’s information is ex-
ponentially small. In the most general case, we imagine
a Bell measurement on each pair just before the distilla-
tion then we obtain the same ρ after distillation. In the
distillation, two remote parties, Alice and Bob need the
local controlled-NOT gate on each side to collect the par-
ity information of a random subset of the raw pairs into
one pair (destination pair) and then measure the parity
of that pair and discard the destination pair. Note that
the parity measurement is a collective measurement of
MiMi. They repeat this step until they they can com-
pute the location of all flipping errors of the remained m
pairs. The initial Bell measurement commutes with all
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operations in distillation therefore can be postponed un-
til the end of the distillation. Moreover, after this delay
we can even remove the step of Bell measurement: with
this removal, they finally obtain m pairs in a different
state, ρ′, but ρ and ρ′ have the same fidelity to m perfect
entangled pairs. And the fidelity value is the only thing
we are caring about here. Moreover, since all destination
pairs have been discarded, it does not affect the fidelity
of ρ′ if they then take local measurement Mi ⊗Mi on
each side to those discarded pairs and then announce the
outcome. Since this local measurement commute with
the parity measurementMiMi, they can exchange the or-
der of them therefore measurementMiMi is unnecessary:
once they announced the specific result of local measure-
ment, they have known the parity already. Therefore all
they need there is just local operation and classical com-
munication (LOCC), this is just BDSW protocol.
Therefore, in doing the entanglement purification or pri-
vacy amplification, we can safely assume that each raw
pairs are in one of the 4 Bell states, |φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ±
|11〉), |ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉). Or equivalently, we can
assume Pauli channel for the qubit transmission:
σx = (
0 1
1 0
), σy = (
0 −i
i 0
), σz = (
1 0
0 −1
) (1)
If Alice starts from N pairs of |φ+〉 state, the bit-flip rate
is defined as the percentage of pairs which have been
changed into state |ψ+〉 or state |ψ−〉; phase-flip rate
is defined as the percentage of pairs which have been
changed into state |φ−〉 or state |ψ−〉. Equivalently, given
Pauli channel, the channel operation σx or σy causes a
bit-flip, the channel operation σy or σz will cause a phase-
flip.
The constraint in classical CSS code. The entangle-
ment distillation can also be done by a type of quantum
error correction code: the CSS code which is named by
it’s inventors, Calderbank, Shor and Steane [13,14]. They
use classical linear codes C1, C
⊥
2 to correct bit-flip errors
and amply the privacy of the final key [15]. Here the
error correction (EC) and privacy amplication (PA) are
decoupled because of the constraint:
C2 ⊂ C1. (2)
Due to this constraint, it is so far not known on how
to construct a large classical CSS code efficiently. Es-
pecially, the construction task is even more complicated
when we have another constraint: C1 must be efficiently
decodable, e.g., Spielman code [12].
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It is not a problem to construct small CSS codes and we
can distill the final key concatenatedly. However, this
method seems not economic: when we use small CSS
codes, we have to assume a large statistical fluctuation
therefore decrease the key rate. Another choice is to use
two-way classical communication in key distillation [11],
however, the key rate is also low.
If we use BDSW protocol [3] with one-way random hash-
ing, we do not need CSS code, we only need a random
matrix, or a linear code, C. However, in the present
form of BDSW protocol [3], the error correction and pri-
vacy amplification are combined together. Whenever any
hashing step is done, there are backward actions there-
fore the remained pairs cannot be simply described by the
criteria of “flipping rate”. To such a case, the efficiently
decodable error correction code given by Spielman [12]
cannot be directly applied. If we use Shanon code for
BDSW protocol, the decoding is complicated.
In short, there are computational difficulties in both
BDSW protocol [3] and CSS code [15] for key distilla-
tion in practice: the construction difficulty in using CSS
code and the decoding complexity in using BDSW proto-
col. In this paper, we modify BDSW method so that the
EC and PA are treated separately with two independent
linear codes. Moreover, after the modification, we can
choose to use Spielman’s code [12] for EC therefore error
correction step is done efficiently. There is no compu-
tational complexity in PA step of our protocol since we
don’t need to really correct the phase-flip errors.
Modified BDSW protocol: error correction and pri-
vacy amplification with two independent parity matri-
ces. We now consider to modify BDSW protocol [3]
therefore EC and PA can be done separately with two
independent parity matrices. In a previous work given by
Lo [16], the BDSW method is modified so that the error
correction and privacy amplification can be done sepa-
rately with two independent matrices. However, there,
a pre-shared secret string used as one-time-pad is re-
quested. Here we don’t use one-time-pad. Our modified
protocol here is laso different from the hashing method
given by Ref [17] where the constraint of eq.(2) is used
and the construction difficulty still exists.
Given N raw pairs, we can use two N−bit binary strings,
the bit string sb and the phase string sp to represent
the quantum state of these raw pairs. Given any raw
pair, if it bears a bit-flip, the corresponding element in
string sb is 1, otherwise it is 0; if it bears a phase-flip,
the corresponding element in string sp is 1, otherwise
it is 0. For example, if the raw pairs are in the state
|φ+〉|φ+〉|ψ+〉|φ−〉|ψ−〉, the two classical strings are
sb = 00101; sp = 00011. (3)
One can see that, the state of raw pairs is explicitly
known if both bit string and phase string are known.
In the BDSW protocol [3] for entanglement distillation,
there are many steps of parity measurement, after each
step, we discard one pair therefore we have a new short-
ened strings for the remained pairs. Our purpose is to
know exactly the strings for the remained pairs after some
hashing steps. For clarity, we shall use sbi, spi to repre-
sent the strings of the remained pairs after step i, e.g.,
we use sb0, sp0 for the initial strings.
Suppose the bit-flip rate is less than δb and the phase-flip
rate is less than δp. Initially the number of likely string
for sb0 and sp0 are less than wb and wp, respectively. Here
wb, wp are determined by δb, δp:
ωb = 2
N ·H(δb);ωp = 2N ·H(δp) (4)
and
H(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1 − x). (5)
After we check the parities in Z basis with an efficiently
decodable linear code C [12] which corrects δbN errors,
we can compute the locations of all bit-flip errors and flip
them back. Note that after this error-correction, string
sp changes due to the backward effect. However, the
number of likely string for sp is still upper bounded by
ωp, the number of likely string for sp0. To do phase er-
ror correction is difficult because of the backward effect.
But to do privacy amplification is simple: Once we know
the number of likely string for sp, we in principle know
how to correct all phase errors and this in principle com-
putability is enough.
There are two independent elementary operations in the
modified BDSW protocol:
(1) Error correction: At step i, the classical binary strings
for the remained N − i qubits are sbi, spi with i being
started from 0. Alice and Bob generate a random binary
string ri and measure the parity value of ri · sbi at each
side and announce the results. The can do the measure-
ment by first collect the parity of all pairs indicated by
non-zero elements in ri to the destination pair, di and
then measure pair di in Z basis at each side. In col-
lecting the parity into pair di, they only need to do the
controlled-NOT operations at each side (bi-CNOT) with
pair di being the target pair and all other pairs indicated
by ri being the controlled pair. They then discard pair
di.
If the initial bit-flip error rate is δb, the number of likely
strings for sb0 is 2
NH(δb). They need run the step for
nb = NH(δb) times to compute the explicit form the
string sbnb and then Bob takes bit-flip operation to those
qubits bearing a bit-flip error. The process can be sum-
marized by error correction through an nb × N random
matrix. Decoding such a random matrix could be very
complicated. However, we can first randomly permute
the qubits and then replace the random matrix by Spiel-
man code [12] which can be decoded efficiently.
We now consider the backward action. We denote
|φ+〉, |φ−〉, |ψ+〉, |ψ−〉 by |χ00〉, |χ01〉, |χ10〉, |χ11〉, respec-
tively. Given two pair state |χa,b〉|χa′,b′〉, if we do bi-
CNOT on this two pairs with the second pair being the
target, we have
|χa,b〉|χa′,b′〉 −→ |χa,b⊕b′〉|χa′⊕a,b′〉. (6)
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Here ⊕ is bitwise sum and each of a, b, a′, b′ can only
take 0 or 1. This shows that, given spi, string spi+1
is determined exactly since the backward action is only
determined by phase flip information of the destination
pair, pair di. That is to say, the so-called backward ac-
tion does not change the number of likely string of spi. If
the initial phase-flip rate is δp, then the number of likely
string for each spi is fixed at ωp0. After doing error cor-
rection, they can then start the second elementary step:
(2) Privacy amplification. If they can also locate all po-
sitions of phase-flip errors, they can then flip them back
and obtain pure entangled pairs therefore complete the
entanglement distillation. At step j, the classical binary
strings for the remained N − j qubits are sbj , spj with
j being started from nb. Alice and Bob generate a ran-
dom binary string rj and measure parity value of rj · spj
at each side and announce the results. The can do the
measurement by first collect the parity in X−basis of all
pairs indicated by non-zero elements in rj to the desti-
nation pair, dj and then measure pair dj in X basis in
each side. To collect the parity, they only need to take
bi-CNOTs in X−basis with pair dj being the target pair
and all other pairs indicated by rj being the controlled
pair. They then discard pair dj . And they use binary
string sbj+1, spj+1 to represent the remained N − j − 1
qubits. It has been proven [3] that, they only need repeat
the step for
np = N ·H(δp) (7)
times in order to specify the final string of sp. How-
ever, since their only purpose is to obtain a secure final
key, they need not take phase-flips to those pairs bear-
ing a phase-flip error. Instead, they may directly mea-
sure the remained pairs after np steps of parity measure-
ment in X-basis. Moreover, since all destination pairs
are discarded, the measurements in X basis to them are
also unnecessary. The only thing now remained here is
the bi-CNOTs in X−basis. These are equivalent to bi-
CNOTs in Z−basis with the target pair and the con-
trolled pairs being reversed. Therefore, all operations
needed in the distillation are done in Z basis and Al-
ice can replace the initial distribution of entangled pairs
by sending Bob single qubits randomly chosen from the
BB84 set {|0〉, |1〉, |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉)}. In each step j,
they simply replace each bits in the set indicated by rj
by the parity of that bit and bit dj and discard the bit
dj . After error correction and privacy amplification, the
remained bits can be used as the final key and the key
rate is
R = 1−H(δb)−H(δp). (8)
QKD with imperfect source. Having removed the com-
putational complexity by the modifying BDSW method
[3], we now consider a type of physical imperfection of
source. In practice, it’s very often to use the weak coher-
ent states in stead of a real single photon source, which
is a difficult technique. However, there will be a small
fraction of multi-photon signals if we use weak coherent
states. To those multi-photon signals, Eve may first split
the light beam, keep one photon with her and send other
photons to Bob. She will wait until Alice announces the
measurement basis of that signal. Such a photon num-
ber splitting (PNS) attack will help Eve to have full in-
formation of bit values of multi-photon signals without
disturbing it at all. More generally, we can use the “tag-
ging” model [18] to describe the type of imperfect source:
Alice uses perfect single photon source but she tells Eve
the exact states of a fraction of her signals . That is to
say, Eve may tag a few of qubits without disturbing them
at all. Here, we treat the issue in a similar way given by
ref [18], but we shall not use CSS code therefore we don’t
have the construction complexity in practice.
For clarity, we consider the entanglement distillation
first. Initially, Alice prepares a number of perfect en-
tangled pairs, |φ+〉. Before entanglement distribution, a
small fraction ∆ of them are tagged by Eve, i.e., Alice
measures these tagged pairs in Z basis or X basis and
tells Eve her measurement bases and outcome. And lat-
ter, in error test or key distillation, those tagged pair
will be , only measured it in the same basis used by Alice
before entanglement distribution. If a tagged pair was
measured in Z basis, the averaged phase-flip error is a
half, after passing through whatever noisy channel. The
proof for this is very simple. According to its definition,
if the measure the pair at each side in X−basis and
obtain different outcome, then we say that pair bears a
phase-flip error. Consider the tagged state |00〉 or |11〉.
If Alice now measures her qubit in X−basis, the out-
come is totally random and has no correlation with any
other qubit. No channel can create correlation between
a qubit and a random result. Therefore, if Bob measures
his qubit in X−basis, he must have half a chance to ob-
tain a different outcome, since otherwise his qubit has
non-zero correlation with Alice’s qubit.
Now let’s consider the error test. The measured error rate
in X−basis on the test pairs does not indicate the correct
value of phase-flip rate of untested pairs. (Here we only
consider the asymptotical result. We don’t consider the
statistical fluctuation, for simplicity.) Since Eve can treat
tagged pairs and untagged pairs differently, we have to
consider them separately. For those untagged pairs, since
the measurement basis of each pair is unknown to Eve,
the result bit errors of the test pairs in X−basis on un-
tagged pairs can be used to indicate the correct phase-flip
error rate of the remained untagged pairs. However, for
those tagged pairs, the situation is different. Alice’s mea-
surement basis has been pre-determined and announced,
they cannot choose basis randomly latter. The measure-
ment outcome of tagged pairs in X−basis does not indi-
cate anything about the phase-flip rate of those untested
tagged pairs in Z−basis. In fact, the phase-flip rate of
tagged pairs in Z−basis is fixed to 50% while the bit-flip
rate of those X−basis tagged pairs can be 0, as Eve likes.
This shows that, if the tested bit-error rate in X−basis
is δp, it could be the worst case that the phase-flip rate
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of the untagged pairs is δp/(1 − ∆) and the phase-flip
rate to tagged pairs is fixed at 50%. Differently, bit-flip
error rate can be indicated correctly by the error test.
Because in this case, the test pairs and the untest pairs
will be measured in the same basis. Before they do the
test, Eve cannot tell which pairs will be used as the test
pairs. Suppose after all error tests, there are N pairs re-
mained.
In bit-flip error correction, the backward action is differ-
ent from that of the perfect source. Say, if the bit-flip
rate is δb, we must take NH(δb) rounds of parity mea-
surement in Z basis. Note that the number of likely
phase string, sp on those remained untagged pairs is now
not fixed, since it is determined by the phase string of
all pairs (Sp) instead of the phase string untagged pairs
only (sp). More specifically, at any round of parity mea-
surement in Z−basis, if the destination pair is untagged,
the the number of likely string sp is unchanged. But
if the destination pair is tagged, the number of likely
string sp for the remained untagged pairs is doubled: the
destination pair has half a chance to bear a phase-flip er-
ror. Actually, the assumption of half a phase-flip error of
the tagged qubit is also the worst-case assumption: this
maximizes the number of likely phase string sp for the
remained untagged pairs. After the bit-flip error correc-
tions are completed, the number of likely string sp for
the remained untagged pairs is
ωp,untagged = 2
(1−∆2)N ·H(δp/(1−∆)). (9)
Here we have used the fact that among all destination
pairs, a fraction ∆ of them had been tagged.
Now we can consider how to do the privacy amplifica-
tion (phase-flip correction). Straightly, we assume half a
phase-flip for each tagged pairs and can just use the in-
creased phase-flip error rate (δp+∆/2) and complete the
distillation. But our purpose here is only to do privacy
amplification rather than entanglement purification. Us-
ing the method giving by ref [18], we can treat the issue
more sophisticatedly. Since we only want to obtain the
final key, it makes no difference for Alice and Bob to mea-
sure each remained pairs in Z−basis before privacy am-
plification. Suppose they have done so. We now see what
happens after the privacy amplification is activated. In
each step of privacy amplification, they randomly choose
a subset Subj. They then randomly choose an amplify-
ing bit dj in set Subj. They replace each bit value vk
in Subj by vk ⊕ vD and vD is the bit value of dj . They
discard bit dj . They repeat such operations for l times.
If they are sure that among all l amplifying (discarded)
bits, at least log2 ωp,untagged of them are originally from
untagged pairs, then those remained bits originally from
untagged pairs are perfectly secure. Since this means a
separate privacy amplification has been taken to the un-
tagged bits. Explicitly, after l rounds, we denote the set
of the remained bits originally from untagged pairs by
{bui}, we have
bui = vui ⊕ vti (10)
and vui is the resultant value due to independent privacy
amplification which only happens to all untagged bits,
vti is the parity of certain tagged bits. Since vui itself
is perfectly secure, bui is also secure. Therefore, after
l rounds of privacy amplification, among all of the re-
mained bits, 1 − ∆ of them are unconditionally secure
while ∆ of them could be still insecure. The fraction ∆
are those bits which are originally from tagged pairs. In
particular,
l =
log2 ωp,untagged
1−∆
= (1 +∆)N ·H
(
δp
1−∆
)
. (11)
And there are
q = N
[
1−H(δb)−H
(
δp
1−∆
)
−∆H
(
δp
1−∆
)]
(12)
bits remained. The next task is to remove those ∆q in-
secure bits. To do so they can simply continue the same
privacy amplification for another ∆q rounds. After ad-
ditional ∆q rounds are taken, each remained bit has the
form of b′ui ⊕ v
′
ti and {b
′
ui} and each elements in {b
′
ui}
are just the parity of certain subset of bui and all b
′
ui are
independent. The final key rate is
Rf = 1−∆− (1−∆)H(δb)
−H
(
δp
1−∆
)
+∆2H
(
δp
1−∆
)
. (13)
Our protocol directly applies to the source of weak coher-
ent states. In our protocol, Alice may choose to measure
all of her qubits in the begining and tells Eve the outcome
of a fraction of them. Given the source of weak coherent
states, since the phase of each signal is random, it is just
an imperfect single-photon source that produces multi-
photon signals occasionally. Here Alice does not tell Eve
any outcome, but the multi-photon signals play the role
of tagged qubits, given the PNS attack.
Summary In summary, we have given a clear picture
on how to do error correction and privation amplification
with two independent parity matrices and all computa-
tional difficulties in practical QKD are removed. We have
also applied our method to the case of QKD with imper-
fect source and given a formula for key rate.
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